I am an Assistant Professor in the Economics Department at the University of Texas at Austin. My research focuses on industrial organization and market design in health insurance and healthcare markets.
2225 Speedway, Stop C3100
Austin, TX 78712
email : marone [at] utexas.edu
View my CV : here
Find me on twitter : @VictoriaMarone_
When Should There be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets? with Adrienne Sabety. January 2022. American Economic Review, 112 (1): 304-42. [Online Appendix] [Replication Materials]
• Summary on Microeconomic Insights
Regulating Markups in U.S. Health Insurance with Steve Cicala and Ethan Lieber. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, October 2019. [Online Appendix] [Replication Materials]
Narrow Networks on the Health Insurance Marketplaces: Prevalence, Pricing, And The Cost Of Network Breadth with Leemore Dafny, Igal Hendel, and Christopher Ody. Health Affairs, September 2017.
All Medicaid Expansions Are Not Created Equal: The Geography and Targeting of the Affordable Care Act with Craig Garthwaite, John Graves, Tal Gross, Zeynal Karaca, and Matthew Notowidigdo. Brookings Institute, September 2019. [NBER Working Paper No. 26289]
Oscar Health Insurance: What Lies Ahead for a Unicorn Insurance Entrant? with Leemore Dafny. Harvard Business School Case 319-025, August 2018 (Revised August 2019).
Multidimensional Screening and Menu Design in Health Insurance Markets with Hector Chade, Amanda Starc, and Jeroen Swinkles
WORK IN PROGRESS
Market Design in Single-Payer Healthcare: Evidence from a GP Allocation System with Ingrid Huitfeldt and Daniel Waldinger
Many centralized assignment systems seek to not only provide good matches for participants' current needs, but also accommodate changing preferences and circumstances. We study the problem of designing such a system in the context of Norway's system for assigning patients to general practitioners (GPs). We provide direct evidence of misallocation under the current system––patients sitting on waitlists for each others' doctors, but who cannot trade––and propose an alternative mechanism that adapts the Top-Trading Cycles algorithm to a dynamic environment. We then estimate a structural model of switching behavior and GP choice and empirically evaluate how this mechanism would perform relative to the status quo. We estimate modest differences in overall GP desirability; as a result, introducing Top-Trading Cycles would dramatically reduce average wait times. Finally, we explore distributional consequences and implications for justified envy.
Winners and Losers Under Counterfactual Health Risk Pooling with Benjamin Vatter
Optimal Insurance for Healthcare Amenities with Ingrid Huitfeldt
The Distributional Effects of Copays in a Single Payer System with Simon Bensnes and Ingrid Huitfeldt
ECO 325K Health Economics – Spring 2022, Spring 2023 (undergraduate)