Victoria Marone

PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS

When Should There be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets? with Adrienne Sabety. January 2022. American Economic Review, 112 (1): 304-42. [Online Appendix] [Replication Materials] [Microeconomic Insights]

Regulating Markups in U.S. Health Insurance with Steve Cicala and Ethan Lieber. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, October 2019. [Online Appendix] [Replication Materials]

Narrow Networks on the Health Insurance Marketplaces: Prevalence, Pricing, And The Cost Of Network Breadth with Leemore Dafny, Igal Hendel, and Christopher Ody. Health Affairs, September 2017.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

All Medicaid Expansions Are Not Created Equal: The Geography and Targeting of the Affordable Care Act with Craig Garthwaite, John Graves, Tal Gross, Zeynal Karaca, and Matthew Notowidigdo. Brookings Institute, September 2019. [NBER Working Paper No. 26289]

Oscar Health Insurance: What Lies Ahead for a Unicorn Insurance Entrant? with Leemore Dafny. Harvard Business School Case 319-025, August 2018 (Revised August 2019). 

WORKING PAPERS

Multidimensional Screening and Menu Design in Health Insurance Markets with Hector Chade, Amanda Starc, and Jeroen Swinkles [December 2023] [NBER Working Paper No. 30542] (Reject and resubmit at American Economic Review)

Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation with Ingrid Huitfeldt and Daniel Waldinger [May 2024] [NBER Working Paper No. 32458] (Revision requested at American Economic Review)

•  Media coverage: Dagens Næringsliv

WORK IN PROGRESS

The Distributional Effects of Cost-Sharing in a Universal Healthcare System with Simon Bensnes and Ingrid Huitfeldt [draft coming soon]    

The Risk Protection Value of Moral Hazard with Angie Acquatella [draft coming soon]  

Abstract: When state-contingent contracts are not feasible, a consumer’s ability to change her behavior in response to insurance can greatly enhance the contract’s ability to transfer resources across states. We show that within a broad class of preferences, ex post moral hazard can play a major role in smoothing the consumer’s marginal utility of income, and thus in increasing the value of risk protection insurance provides. Under standard parameterizations of consumer demand for healthcare and health insurance, estimates in the literature imply that moral hazard accounts for as much as 25 percent of the total value of risk protection derived from insurance. Moreover, in some cases, insurance contracts that permit ex post moral hazard increase social welfare relative to contracts that prevent the consumer from changing her behavior in response to insurance.

Health Insurance for Healthcare Amenities with Ingrid Huitfeldt

Abstract: We consider a model of a health insurance market in which sick consumers face a choice of healthcare amenity level. A minimum amenity level is available at no out-of-pocket cost (under some universal, base level of insurance coverage), but consumer heterogeneity drives demand for higher amenity levels. We study two central policy questions related to the design of "top-up'' insurance markets: (i) at what level to set the universally-available minimum amenity level, and (ii) whether consumers should retain the monetary value of this benefit if they choose a higher amenity level. We estimate the model in the context of the Norwegian market for Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART).  

TEACHING

ECO 325K Health Economics: Spring 2022–Spring 2025 (undergraduate)